Wednesday, February 23, 2011

Brent Everett Free Videp

Truth of the Faith - Part V

continue deepening the "Truth of the Faith" through the careful analysis of St. Alphonsus Maria de 'Liguori. Today we will read the chapter V, where once again the Bishop and Doctor of the Church focuses on the existence of God through careful observation of the material and rebuttal declarations of the materialists.


Thus we read what he has to tell us today, the Holy Founder of the Redemptorists on the existence of our Creator, Savior, Lord and God






Truth of the Faith

St. Alphonsus Maria de 'Liguori

CAP. V. It proves the existence of God from the motion of 'bodies, or both of the matter.

1. So materialists say that so the bodies as souls, all is matter, and that this matter has not been created, but she is uncreated and eternal state. But we must consider that the matter is not preserved or if it spreads with the motion. While using the bike live and propagate animals, plants, and thus also for half of the motion have the benefit of 'planets, the winds and rains. Ceasing the motion for a moment here that the rivers lose their way, the sea becomes a lagoon, and are deprived of life all men, brutes, and plants. Or in this movement who is the cause? Let no from itself body can move, because the matter is not viable and inert, besides it is the principle of all philosophers, and it is obvious to everyone that every moving body is moved by others. This other reason can not be another body, because if Let no body can take the bike itself, let alone can give to others. So every body ought to necessarily receive the motion by an agent that is not material but spiritual. Or you ask whence this matter and we see that these bodies have received and get the bike? By others or by themselves? Respond in two ways materialists. Epicurus and Spinoza say that this motion of matter had no beginning, but it's been forever, and always continued to date, e continuerà per via d'impulsi successivi. Ecco come parla Spinoza:  Corpus motum vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, et illud iterum ab alio, et sic in infinitum 1 . Gli stratonici all'incontro col loro maestro Stratone e col moderno signor Tolland dicono che il principio e la causa del moto è nella stessa materia, la quale ha in sé la virtù motrice.

2. Ma rispondiamo che né l'una né l'altra opinione ha sussistenza. Non può sussistere la prima di Epicuro e Spinoza del moto eterno per via di successivi impulsi, per due ragioni. La prima, because the motion is eternal Impertrans, so that if this motion had been eternity, could never arrive at the present time, it should have passed to us for the next leg of infinite pulse, and Infinity, for failing principle, Impertrans, as Aristotle says, and all other philosophers.


3. And he says the same reason, because an infinite number of these pulses, reaching the present time, should have final say, but this is a clear contradiction to say that the infinite finite. And so, if the world was eternity, eternity and were human generations, no man could be born, and why? because no man would be a time to be born, until he was last an infinite number of generations. But the infinite number is impossible to scroll, scroll for this infinite power, and come to an end, should have taken the beginning. So after giving us time to build a man who is born, we should give the beginning and end forever, and that is impossible.


4. Also speaks well to the p. Valsecchi, and says if this last body ought to be given by other bikes, because it is inert, it ought still to be determined, the other second above it, and so the third and fourth, and if all are bodies, because not all have the same need? Perhaps because they are endless, changing nature? If they are all bodies, all are inert, unable to move. So apart from their infinite multitude hath always need a spiritual principle that has given them motion, saying that none of them could not have or give, or else to assume this endless succession of impulses eternity, would assume the effect without the cause and passion without action. Each bike in the field is produced by an extrinsic agent, but in this system of Epicurus there is no cause that produces the motion. If the body A pushes B, B and C drives: removing A or B or C have more bikes, otherwise there would be no effect without cause. Nor can it be to suppose the infinite series of pulses, because there is an infinite effect without cause none. Indeed, for this infinite motion of material objects, there should be a first cause he had an infinite power, to be the cause of endless motion. A learned author, theologian Dr. John Hooke of the Sorbonne, in his scholarly work Relig. Nat. et Rev., says: pretend pendesse a chain from heaven to earth, so that she may support a second ring, the third will support two, nine-tenth, the hundredth ninety-nine. So the rings must have more strength than ever degl'inferiori. Or suppose in an endless series of rings, we must also assume an infinite power to support them. So none of these bodies would have had endless motion, had it not been the engine that had given the first impulse, and more from time to time he had renewed. While property de 'motions communicated to' bodies always going to languish, and finally to finish, if you do not have new growth. So the infinite series of pulses remains but the difficulty increases. The same difficulties that Spinoza questioned, he could not dissolve it, and escaped to answer, as you can see from his letters, especially from the point 63.

5. He adds that if the law was eternal and uncreated, she was also required, being self-independent, whence it would necessarily have been more motionless and unchangeable according to its nature of inertia and laziness, because it is of a substance necessary and always keep the second independent its nature. Other then when the matter is considered contingent, because then, as she may be receiving from others who had not, so it can also get the bike that does not in his nature.

6. We come now to the views of Strato, who says that matter has in itself the power to move. This view may not even exist. First place, because as already mentioned, it is precisely the matter to be motionless, and indeed she has a property essentially opposite to the motion, because every body is resistant to changing its state, and therefore the philosophers
say that the strength of the material that is not vis inertiae; and the more or less the size of the body, more or less is the resistance that makes the motion, and with what you know force of inertia that matter. Therefore repugnant to the very nature of matter have intrinsic motion and of itself. In order to see if any motion in the matter, we must say that she is moved by others, according to the common axiom: movetur Omne quod ab alio movetur.


7. Secondly, if the topic if it had motion, she would useless to the construction of the world. As for that same path of motion, so we form things, for the same motion could not then exist. So as before, it is not elle, because of motion would be made, so continuing the matter to move by themselves are disfarebbero. And so the continuing confusion over who would be all the things happen that other incident so repugnant to the nature and experience, who would dispose of the bodies themselves for this same path of motion for which they formed. And in fact constantly points out that those things then you change or are destroyed, never by itself but only by some extrinsic cause are changed or destroyed, because of rest all things naturally tend to the preservation of their own.

8. Moreover, if the matter is he set out for itself, its movements by those who would never set? They will say: the nature of 'bodies. So I say, we would not be possible to stop arbitrary and a matter, a house, a vineyard in one place, as already practiced by us, to obtain this' comfortable that there are necessary or useful to human life because the same material for its intrinsic and natural motion itself trasporterebbesi elsewhere. Nor is the reply that the matter is indifferent to motion and rest, because in fact this replica de 'materialists shows clearly the lack of their system. Since telling them that the matter is irrelevant to the state and to the motion, therefore, we reply, it is false that the subject has in itself the power to move. But to answer directly to their reply, the answer is: yes, the subject is indifferent to motion and rest, and therefore is liable to the motion, and when she is pushed by others, but by itself is not able to move, and even when she is moved, and lacks the strength of the pulse returns to its natural tranquility.

9. In conclusion, therefore, all in short. If it is said that the matter moves with eternal motion, we say that this is impossible. First, because eternity is Impertrans, and since it has no beginning, so he can not go on forever. Second, because having this motion (though eternal) have been produced by an extrinsic cause, can never be supposed, if you are not supposed to still the case which has had the drive, otherwise it would be an effect without cause.

10. If then it is said that the matter has intrinsic virtue in itself to move, we reply that the matter of its very nature is unworkable and stupid, so necessarily had to get the other bike. No, says the Tolland, the motion is an essential property of matter. But we reply that the essential property of an object is the object of which can not be private; v. gr., extension property is essential to every body, so every body ought necessarily to be extended. But not all the bodies, or at least not always in motion, and are indifferent to stay in motion and at rest, then the motion is not an essential property of matter.

11. But we hear the Tolland as evidence that the motion is an essential property of matter. He will try this: Every matter says is divisible divisibility of matter is inconceivable without a bike because the bike is what splits: thus conclusive, the motion is an essential property of matter. But here
is too light the fallacy of this test. Mr. Tolland divisibility confused with the division. Another is the divisibility of matter, the other is division of matter. division can not be conceived without a bike, but can well be conceived without the motion divisibility; because the subject is likely to be divided, but is not likely to divide itself, since it is capable of being move, but is unable to move by itself. And so, since it is an essential property of matter can be moved and divided, so too is its essential property can not be divided either by itself or move, while I was by its nature inert and unworkable. Replica Tolland and says that all matter is in motion by destroying, or increase. But he replied that such a motion is not intrinsic to the material, which is inert, but foreign and extrinsic, caused by external impulses, without which she would always rest. This impulse can not then proceed to other external material body, made for the same reason, because all matter is inert. Therefore must be obtained from an engine which is superior to matter.


12. Nor does the Tolland to say that if the matter is not essential to the motion, at least, it is essential to the slope, the tendency to motion, which he called effort. first place, we say that this is a pure invention chimeric baseless to say that every body has a slope to the motion. But, as in the field there is this dream effort to move, she wonders what part to tilt to move, for right or left? He will say that tilts to move for each side? But for this she will be the same unable to move, because, although it was capable, the same trends are contrary to each other would retain the increasingly immobile and unable to move. So the matter may not have the bike from a principle extrinsic and intangible, that has the virtue of being able to move. I say immaterial; because if the material body, it can not even move, let alone give motion to another body. Now this principle and extrinsic intangible we call to be God, infinitely powerful, free and ruler of all, that not only moves the world, but it moves with such order and symmetry. Just consider only run so smooth and stable of 'heaven and the stars of' planets, to know that can not be other engine, if not a God of infinite power and wisdom. If you see a watch that shows on time and ring the hours, who can ever say that metal has joined himself, and if you still are trained all the wheels, springs and the order in which they walk?

13. And this gives the wonder Rousseau, who, after having demonstrated the existence of God for the motion and order that you see in the world, writes: I believe, therefore, that the world is ruled by a powerful desire and wise, I see it, or rather I feel it, and this is what I care to know. But then this is the same world he created or eternal? There is a single principle of things? There are two or more? And what is their nature? I do not know anything and that I care to know 1 ? But here's the contradiction. Ben replied Fr Valsecchi 2. If the world were eternal, the two reasons of its motion and order no more prove the existence of God, because ever since the world no longer is God the author. Perhaps the answers that matter is eternal and uncreated, and God then changed it and orders? But if matter is eternal, then she is saying and is independent, and if it is independent, as God was able to modify it and order it? But since he has modified it and ordered his will, we must still say that he has created. But back to our point, from everything that has been said that the matter siegue it receives all its forces from the divine efficacy, which all its motions are just effects
the will of God, which by itself or immediately, or other bodies created to move all his pleasure, and that the whole order of things in this world is not from God, who governs and regulates the whole. And therefore the philosopher Newton wisely says that the knowledge of God because of 'experimental philosophy is for the phenomena.


14. But before I finish this chapter does not want to leave to adduce a bell'argomento that some material at the p. Valsecchi a door in favor of his materialism. Who knows, says, who are not being thousand springs and forces likely to produce such and such effects? This is the study degl'increduli modern, not to prove what they say, but cast doubt all these things are also clear with the usual phrases: We do not know what it's nature, because may not be so and so.? But the author found that his Who knows, would be to try at least possible that there may be forces and sources in being able to produce effects without the divine hand. But when we have proved that matter can not move, because it is by its nature inert and not likely to move, that is to say: Who knows who are not being thousand springs and forces are able to produce such and such effects? Responds lepida Fr Valsecchi this inept Who knows, and says the air and who knows there are forces likely to make us believe that there is a city of Constantinople, and that there really is? And then it speaks well: it is impossible that there are forces in nature that without God possan give existence to this world. Because these forces are, or identification with the corporeal world, or are different from this world. It is impossible to empathize with others, because the material she being unable to act, he could never train or a car that can withstand motion and order. Especially since the world has united to the souls' bodies, which are spiritual, as demonstrated in the following chapter, and therefore can not be produced by matter being totally different in nature. And if these forces are different from this world body, or elle are dependent on a principle top straps, and then they are not the first causes of the world, but because such a principle is something from which they derive strength. If the meeting are independent of any principles, then you can not ch'elleno, being purely material, and consequently without wisdom and mindless, abbian able to form, and can hold up this world, so stand up and be in the order and symmetry with which they view the world existence, has been and will always need a great mind and a supreme wisdom. Furthermore, if these forces were independent of other principle, would be self-elle, and consequently necessary, eternal and infinite, and since many would be more independent and infinite beings. Lastly, asking: this being where such forces and sources, he is saying and independent? And if it is self-independent, ought to have all this being, mind, power and wisdom and everything infinitely, and if it goes well, he is God, already different from the world and the subject, but author of the subject and the world.

____________________________

an Ethic. p. 2. prop. 13. Emil

1. t. 1.

2 L. 1. c. 2.

1 L. 1. c. 3. No 13.

0 comments:

Post a Comment