continue each Wednesday as the deepening of the "Truth of the Faith" through the careful analysis of St. Alphonsus Maria de 'Liguori. As mentioned last week, today we venture into five sections of Chapter VI, starting from the first that demonstrate how the matter can not think and then the mind is not material but spiritual in nature. St. Alphonsus prove God's existence through a thorough face to refute the words of the materialists who deny the existence of the Creator, carefully examining the body and soul, studying the mechanisms, catapulted to the understanding of spiritual things.
Let now the word Doctor of the Church of the Holy Bishop and Founder of the Redemptorists to better understand the nature of the material and spiritual things
Truth Faith
St. Alphonsus Maria de 'Liguori
§. 1. The matter can not you mind you think.
2. First, it is impossible that the matter might have minds that think, because there is no way we can give the materialists, which the soul, being extended matter, could have no thought of mind and perception. Having the mind and thought forms and your soul, so as the soul or is the spirit can not be subject, according to what our Savior said to the Apostles: Palpate videte et, quia spiritus et carnem bones Habet 1, so the matter can not be spirit. Each field consists of shares divisible, so if the soul is matter, would consist of parts. Or, since the soul had parties, inquiring what part of it is what I think? Or it is said that each part is the mind that thinks and feels all thought, and this is not true, because if so, how many parts of the extended matter, a lot of us would be thinking substances, so there is in us a multitude percipient minds: either it says it does not already each party thinks, but the union of all the parts make up your mind that thinks and feels, and this can even exist, because if the mind has no part, nor can the mind be all that is made of the same parts, while the aggregate parties can not be different from that which the parties have. Since the union of non-extended things can never be an extended object, and as the pool of shares that are devoid of life can not contener life, so the pool of shares that are not mindless mind contener .
3. Nor can it be said that each party perceives the soul part of the object, so everything but the thought is perceived by the soul, but divided by each of its parts, because if it were so, we do not entirely understand Might they be ever thought, while, after the parties' distinct from one another, and having all materials, one o'clock could not communicate what the other understands. Nor can finally say that only some points individual soul conceived all thought, so that all the other parties tend to that point, as their center, because of what you answer: what is meant by this individual or is indivisible ? If defined as a point of the matter at hand and in practice, in which case this
point, having its extension, must necessarily have its parts, and therefore can not be said to never be separated. If we mean a point in the abstract, ie mathematical point or be ideal, the issue is over, because the mind perceives that thought, would not be in any material part of the soul, but in an ideal, which is not more matter. But this is contrary to 'materialists, who say that the soul is matter, not understood metaphysically, but actually extended.
4. Secondly, if the substance was thinking body, should that thought had extension site and shape. Or those who never can judge every thought can be divided, and either square or triangular? Also, if there was soul extension, shape and site, these things would all be inert and not viable, and we encounter the thought is conceived as an operation of the soul. Nor is to say that thoughts are formed in us coll'impressione, which becomes soft particles in our brain connected the external objects who send us material. As to what it responds first that the idea of \u200b\u200ba motion of material particles is quite different than the idea of \u200b\u200bthought waves, although often form in us the thought to the impression of some external sensible object, then, however, is not body, but the soul that thinks, so although the thought of both material things and processes by the ghost but the ghost is material, but the thought is entirely spiritual. And that thought is formed by the spirit which is man and not from matter, of course you know to see that sometimes the fantasy is something that is not so, and the spirit with the correct reason. For example, if you see a paddle in the sea water that is half in and half out, the fantasy as it is broken, but the intellect which is spiritual, knows that oar is full, and that appearance is born by the refraction and reflection rays. Or this review certainly does not come from matter, because according to the appearance impressed by the matter ought to judge the oar broke, then comes the spirit that corrects the error with the reason of the imagination.
5. Thirdly, it is certain that the organs of our senses are all different among themselves, the eyes see, smell the nostrils, ears hear ec. It is then up to us, who distinguish, compare and prefers the second sense of pleasure. For example, some prefer the pleasure of sound with that smell, the sense of taste to that of sight. Now this court are certainly not the bodies, because the feeling of an organ can not have knowledge or form of assessment of the sensation of another body, whether one or more less pleasure nor this court may be the brain or other body part to which they refer through the bodies of 'nerves as the brain or other sensor that has multiple parts, each of these parties receives the impression of a particular body, so a party can not judge the feeling of the other. So the court, which includes all these feelings and distinguishes them, is an indivisible spiritual substance, which is precisely the soul. Here is how clearly the Cicero writes: Here quod eadem res dissimillimas comprehendimus mind, ut colorem, saporem, calorem, odorem, sonum, quae quinque Nunquam Nuntiis cognosceret animus, nisi omnia referrentur for, is et omnium solus esset iudex 1 ? More clearly is that the sensations that we receive it 'senses of the body, can never produce the intelligence of things, because otherwise would cause a feeling the same effects in different people. For example, if the sound of the voice Ignis produced by the intelligence itself, or is the idea of \u200b\u200bfire, because of the feeling that makes the ears of all who are present in one place, so that would be the scholar, as the ignorant alike are hoping dell'idioma Latin
the meaning of that word. But the thing is not to be so, because the ignorant do not understand, The learned since then will know that the convention made between 'the Latin word ignis means fire. But these conventions only spiritual substances are capable, not the materials, which will operate without necessarily will, every man should also necessarily with the same feeling the same intelligence cause of fire.
6. For the fourth field can have no other idea of \u200b\u200bmaterial objects, but often we are pure spiritual thoughts, of things not subject to the senses. If the man had not the spiritual, but material, as the matter may give idea of justice, of prudence? As of eternity, the proportion of objects, the nature of things and the like? Furthermore, what pleasure does not make him discover some abstract truth? This pleasure can never be material. It adds that the material works only when objects are present, but the soul is also believed to 'distant past and future. It adds that the material does not change from place to place, if not over time and by any means, but the soul in a moment and think of different places without half distantissimi between them.
7. For the fifth freedom in which we perceive in wanting or not wanting something, or refuse to accept a gift, what good will make sure that we have a spirit soul, otherwise if this freedom was material, it may prevent an object outside material, for example, may well prevent us from seeing some with close your eyes or hear with your ears clogged, but no one can prevent the thought of wanting or not wanting, so the thought is not material. More if the soul is material, she would necessarily be determined to do everything, to which the matter in his motion the wheels. But we see that sometimes a man abstains from certain actions delightful, which is moved by tilting de 'senses. And why n'astiene? Because reason dictates that action is harmful or not to suit him. Sometimes, in fact some hugs painful things, moved by reason only that offers the advantage of that penalty. What ever instinct of matter could lead to the holy martyrs to embrace torture and death if they had not been persuaded to embrace them by reason? So if man is free to do or suspend its operations, if it has freedom to operate against the inclination of 'meaning, it must be confessed that these operations are not the subject, but of the spirit, because if they were in the area it should necessarily depend on that man, and be forced to work for everything that matter in his motion and determines the incline.
8. More glue if the motion were formed on the thoughts, the man could never feel a thing at the same time and reflect upon that, as often happens. Certainly could it not, or because the reflection would be for the same motion, to which a perception, and this can not be, because the perception and reflection on the two separate acts, so as to form an 's other materials you need two motions, one direct and one reflected, and therefore elle are mutually different and distinct. If then it is said that the perception and reflection are two different motions can take place either this response, because when you made the second motion is stopped the first, or at least disturb the motion of the reflection the perception of motion, and thus could never occur at the same time the reflection of the perception, since the mind to reflect on a thought, ought to have thought out his eyes, but if the thought were material, as early as the second motion reflection would have been defeated, or at least confused.
9. Moreover, if the thinking substance
was the matter, should that not only the simple thought, but the proceedings did involve motion of matter, but this is impossible, because the trial is the union of two ideas formed from the subject and predicate. Waves if this view of mind depended on the motion of matter, should be formed by the joining together of two motions made materials at the same time, but several of these two motions made at the same time destroy the other one o'clock, as we said above, speaking of perception and reflection, because the motion to form the idea of \u200b\u200bthe predicate would destroy or confuse the motion that formed the idea of \u200b\u200bthe subject. Nor can it be said that these two motions can produce a third motion which was then the proceedings, because those motions can not produce a different point of parties other than their own, so could never form any opinion. Nor can the man be a reason, if this were to reasoning formed by the motion of matter, while the reasoning of two forms coll'unione giudizj, which are the highest and lowest, and then combine these two giudizj with the third, which is the result, and that none of this happens without 'first two giudizj destroy or confuse you, otherwise it could be the right conclusion. Or if both the reasoning or syllogism consisted in the motion of matter could never conceive of any conclusion, because when it happens the second motion would have ended the first, and the third would cease when that happens the first and second. Nor can it be said that these motions at the same time to unite and form the reasoning, because, as we have said, a motion would disturb the other, or also get confused with each other, as two different motions are in the same string that the sound of a motorcycle abolish the other, or be confused with it. Nor finally by such motions may form on a sermon, which is the union of many raziocinj. All the more so in these three motions materials one does not have knowledge of them; the meeting and, as has been said to result from the dedur greater and lower, one must present one and the other with the clear knowledge of both. So since all the three motions materials, and not having none elle knowledge of each other, no conclusion could never occur.
10. Finally it is shown that the soul may be thinking not matter, for reasons of freedom to operate that the soul has. The matter, as has been said, is inert, not capable of acting, whence is subject to the laws of mechanics, which necessarily is determined to rest or motion. The meeting is a power of freedom to choose, or even to act or not act on his will. So freedom is not the dowry of the matter, but of a different substance capable of freedom, what is the spirit. And this reason Rousseau had to admit to not being able to deny that the soul is spiritual. He in his speech sull'inegualità part of men. 1. says: Nature commands every animal, and the beast obeys. The man feels the same impression, but he recognizes free to consent or resist, and in the knowledge of this inner freedom above all demonstrates the spirituality of the soul: since the physics in some way explains the mechanism of 'senses and the formation of ideas, but in the power of will, or as soon as possible to elect, and the feeling of this power can not be found, which acts purely spiritual, of 'which he says nothing to the laws of mechanics. But Answering those strong spirits, who deny freedom to us and say that we operate as a necessary motion ORIUOLO material inside or outside? And how do they feel? Here it is: the human will say that what the intellect siegue
proposes, the man and so, necessarily, not freely operate. Short answer, and say that man, having been created by God reasonable, it can not make use of reason, but this does not prevent his freedom, so that it can not, whenever he wants to operate at will, even against the reason. And would to God that we often did not operate against reason, driven not by reason but by passion! Why we would not be guilty of many sins in the trial divine.
11. It remains to answer three objections that are materialists. They say to 1. What does not take place can not be conceived ch'esista, because everything ch'esiste goddesses have the extension. You respond so that the speaker believes to be no other things except those which are subject to 'meaning, but has already proved above that there are many items that are not subject to' the meaning, and if there are such objects purely spiritual, as a consequence can not be found in a person or place to be material but are found only in a spiritual subject, because the person ought to be of the same spiritual nature, which is the object.
12. They say by 2. Our soul can not exist in all parts of the body, because the other parts would remain dead, nor can all exist in each party, because if it existed, would multiply. In order to conclude that can not be understood as the soul exists in the body. But you reply that the soul is not divided into each part of the body, nor is all in a single party, so that should be multiplied by the other, but it is all in the whole body, so that she gives life and moves all parts of the body, not multiply and divide without, as missing or adding some parts of the body, lacks neither s'aumenta some portion of blood.
13. They say by 3. If the soul is not expanded, and does not take place, she would be immobile in order that a soul can be found in the ground, could find themselves in the sky. It says that the soul can never agree on the term of property, because this term supposed place of employment, but, as mentioned above, the spirit does not occupy, and can not occupy any place, but only works in some places and while passing in several places, in that it now operates in a time and place to another.
14. I want to conclude this paragraph by doing a search to 'materialistic lords. They consider that each object is made from matter that is not right, but need to work according to his natural inclination. Therefore, if the matter has no mind or reason, can not give it to others. Or place what I ask: by whom they have received this reason, which makes such a trial? If they say that their minds are produced by matter, are saying that they are produced from nothing, and indeed it is less absurd to say that they are produced out of nothing, that means to be produced from matter, because the nature of the matter is quite different from that of the mind, which is purely spiritual. Therefore if you take the materialistic reasons for concluding that it no God, and everything is matter; here is that these same reasons they feel that they are not the subject, and could not be had by the subject, which has no reason, but have had to receive a supreme being who has a wise and mind of a perfect reason.
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1 Luc. 24. 59.
1 L. 1. TUSC. Quaestio.
1 L. 1. TUSC. Quaestio.
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