continued advancing on the "Truth of the Faith" through the careful analysis of St. Alphonsus Maria de 'Liguori with Section 2 of Chapter VI in which the Holy Doctor of the Church, Bishop and Founder of the Redemptorists refutes the views of Epicurus, Hobbes Strato and who argue that the matter might think. It's up to then de 'Liguori (Santo) demonstrate the opposite, namely that thought is a spiritual and not material as claimed by the three listed above.
Immergiamoci So in this reading apologetics accessible to everyone thanks to the work of the Holy Bishop of Naples which we pray to help us to ponder and keep in the heart of these holy meditations, hoping it will be useful not only to us but also to those wishing to approach the Truth of the Faith "easily understandable thanks to the founder of the Redemptorists quest'operetta:
Truth of the Faith
St. Alphonsus Maria de 'Liguori
§. 2. It refutes the three views according to which defend materialists that matter can think of.
15. The first review was of Epicurus, who said that the virtue of thinking is attached to the subject, and arises from its different conditions, that is, its size, shape, location and motion. The second view is Hobbes, who wrote that thinking comes only from the motion of material particles. The third review was Straton's (like lead) who said that thinking is a virtue inherent in matter of course.
16. The first review of Epicurus, that depends on different diseases cogitare shape, etc. site. Is clearly false, because such conditions can never change its nature of matter. If the site, shape and motion leads the cogitation on the subject, which would make it all had different nature from its parts, which Epicurus confesses not have the force of thinking. The nature of all that is the union of the parties, can not be different from the nature of the parties, otherwise it would be enough to divide a body, or shape or make him change his site for him to change his nature. So wanting to give birth to the Epicureans cogitation from those diseases, they want to bring it into being from nothing and without efficient cause, while the natural affections of matter are not and can be nothing but the same subject.
17. Equally false is the second review of Hobbes, that thought is due solely to the motion of matter. But that never has to do with the idea the idea of \u200b\u200bmotion of thought? The motion can not cause more than the division or growth, or even the different state of matter, but as these things can form the cogitation? And if they thought the motions of matter, any new bike would cause new thought, indeed it would be the same thought: Hobbes denies that the same thing.
18. But we hear in the system than he ever thought to be formed by the motion of matter. Here's how he explains it: Case sensionis east externum corpus, quod organum premit proprium, et pressing efficit motum introrsum to cerebrum, et inde ad cor, cordis conatus liberantis unde unborn child if under pressure to motum tendentem extrorsum (that is what motion he called reaction ) here motus apparet tanquam aliquid externum; alque apparitionem hanc, sive vocamus sensionem phantasm, that is cogitationem; thus intends to Hobbes in his Leviathan , ch. I. But everyone recognizes that this is not speaking as a philosopher, but a madman. And yet nowadays this, or something like this is the philosophy that fashion since in our Italy intruded, and ruined many poor young people, who, eager to acquire new knowledge, and lovers of freedom, being pushed by boiling the young, at the end of their lead a quieter life, free from fear, as they say, the people affected, easily induced to believe these trifles, or even to doubt the truth of faith, and so then they indulge in 'vice, boasting the infamous name of strong spirits, and despise religion, God and everything. Oh misery! God has created in the likeness of himself, and they are studying to become like the beasts.
19. But let's get to the point. If the motions of these particles were thoughts, or cause the thought, all necessarily the thoughts arise in us from every motion of these parts and all at random and without advice, so there would be more in us no freedom to think, nor wisdom, nor security for the future, which we encounter things we experience in ourselves which are of our election.
20. We remind you that we often have on things past, and reflections on those who do, are moments for us, as we see, while we remember the many events that occurred a long time, and we stop to reflect on those. But if these thoughts are nothing but the motions of matter, namely the brain and blood and ghosts that we receive from external objects, the subject of cogitation would not be permanent, but traveler looking traveler looking as it is the motion of matter, so that we could no longer reflect on our perceptions, or have more memory. To determine if memory should be said that that perception would be transferred several years later, still always keeping with its system of particles, otherwise mutandosi that figure would vanish perception and memory of that.
21. Who would then use the general de 'peripatetic, who say that material objects we send in some ghosts on small and thin, and that these means of' creep pores in the brain, and give rise to the thought, would keep for another review today and try to be all modern. After all they all say the same peripatetic way that the soul is always thinking, not matter or is the brain.
22. The third view finally Strato, that virtue is inherent to cogitate on the same matter, which itself is cogitante, is false and inadequate in others. The reason is, as we said above, that the matter can not we consider other quality, extension, division, mobility and shape, but not of perception or thought. If the thought belonged to the essence of matter, as Stratonice say, every piece of matter, since it contains within itself its size and its shape, contains even thought, so that every part of our body was right to think and think. But who can imagine this trifle so big?
23. The cogitation itself repugnant to the nature of matter, which is a substance composed of different particles separate and distinct, but the cogitation is not divisible, because it is composed of parts, but all simple and identified as the man at the same time without succession of time, with one act, thinking about things, or judge of them, or do other designs, or provides for the future. Now these thoughts can not be composed of several parts, because, if for example the virtue of thinking the union consisted of ABC shares, or that virtue would be in each of the parties or the knowledge of those: it can be in either part, because identifies the material quality of the Part A can not be identified in Part B, while each piece of matter has its own individual nature, and the individual quality of a party, not of individual quality may be another, so, being Ellen of different individual nature, do not form a thought, but many thoughts are quant'elle. Nor can it be to cogitate the virtue of the union of several parts, because, as mentioned above, the natural quality of any whole can not be different from the quality of its parts, since all differ from themselves, wherefore he that if the parties were not extended, could not be extended to all, and if the parties could not move, nor could all have bikes. Therefore, if the parties do not have to think about virtue, according elle separate, for reasons that virtue would be divided between the parties, not all can think of.
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